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Emanuela Guano

Taxpayers, Thieves, and the State:
Fiscal Citizenship in Contemporary Italy
Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, 75:4 (2010): 377–401
Introduction
Whoever cheats on taxes is a triple thief. He [sic] is a thief because he
subtracts resources from the community where he lives. These resources won’t
be destined to schools, hospitals, and streets. He is twice a thief because other
citizens must pay more [taxes] because of him. He is a triple thief because he
uses the Country’s infrastructures for free. Evading taxes is like robbing;
better, it’s a robbery without risks: politicians keep lookout [as one steals].1
Thus Beppe Grillo, Italy’s most popular, if controversial, stand-up comedian,
political activist, and blogger, recapitulates the issue of fiscal evasion: a problem that,
in this country, is particularly acute. Indeed, Grillo’s Italy is populated by a multitude
of “thieves”—that is, individuals who take advantage of the common good without
contributing to it. According to a EU.R.E.S report issued in 2007, about 60% of
craftsmen evade taxes, and so do 45% of all professionals. Between 2004 and 2007,
tax evasion tripled among business owners, even as it showed a moderate decrease
among barbers, hair dressers, maids, and badanti (caregivers for the elderly).
Having fewer ways of dodging a fiscal pressure that is frequently described as
among the highest in Europe,2 Italy’s fixed-income classes are often painfully aware
that the burden of stemming the country’s whopping public debt falls largely on their
shoulders. This is an overwhelming responsibility, indeed: after its public debt soared
to 1,761.191 billion euros (Banca d’Italia Eurosistema 2010:2), in 2010 Italy earned a
seat among the PIIGS—that is, the European Union countries at risk of default:
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Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Given the predicament of Italy’s public finances,
the issue of who pays taxes and who does not is bound to stir sanguine discussions in
the Italian public sphere.
Online newspaper forums, for example, are frequent sounding boards for
citizens’ concerns. “No voting rights for repeat evaders” was the (remarkably popular)
proposal a reader made in February 2009 from the online site of L’Espresso, Italy’s
foremost progressive political magazine.3 Only a few months later, a similarly intense
debate was sparked by another reader’s suggestion of instituting a tax fraud hotline
with a reward of 50 euros for each call plus monthly prizes for informers.4 This stance
on evasion is corroborated by the rhetoric of Italian leftist parties and coalitions.
Between 2006 and 2008, a slogan by the center-left government led by Romano
Prodi, “pagare tutti per pagare meno” (if everybody pays, taxes will decrease), spoke
mostly to the fixed-income classes that, since at least the 1970s, have been by and
large bearing the brunt of fiscal policies that, in spite of seemingly strict regulations,
create comfortable loopholes for the wealthy (Cantaro 1990; Ferrera 1984).
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, such a strong resentment against
evaders is fully matched by the anti-tax sentiments of not only entrepreneurs and
professionals, but also and above all the small business owners who constitute a pillar
of the Italian economy (Blim 1990; Shin and Agnew 2009). It is the latter’s views that
often find an echo in the highly mediatized rhetoric of conservative politicians.5 In
recent years, populists like multi-millionaire Silvio Berlusconi and Northern League
leader Umberto Bossi, whose motto is pagare meno per pagare tutti” (if taxes
decrease, everybody will pay), have frequently invited their voters to enact sciopero
fiscale (fiscal strike), thus contributing to legitimizing fiscal evasion not as a crime,
but rather as a tool of political struggle against an unjust state.6
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Competing stances such as these point to the centrality of the fiscal contract to
the Italian social and political imaginary. Drawing on research conducted from 2002
through 2009, 7 in this paper I explore how debates about tax evasion and just
distribution provide Italian citizens with a medium to keep assaying their rights and
duties vis-à-vis the state as well as each other. I contend that, while interwoven with
anti-tax sentiments, representations of the fiscal contract may also be infused with
nostalgia for a Keynesian state that, in Italy, was never realized. I conclude by
suggesting that the modern Italian state is implicated in the divisiveness of society as
well as in a competitive model of citizenship: one whereby social categories that
mistrust the state even as they lay claim to its resources may cast each other as an
impediment to the fulfillment of their respective rights.8

Fuzzy State Logic
As the past participle of the verbs essere and stare (to be and to stand) the
Italian word for “state”—stato—reflects a reification (Herzfeld 2004:73) whereby an
entity that is fluidly embodied in relationships, practices, places, people, and things
(Aretxaga 2006, Bourdieu 1999; Gupta 1995; Taussig 1993) seeks to conceal the
fuzziness of its boundaries through the fiction of its separation from society (Mitchell
1999, Taussig 1993). This fiction of detachment rests on, even as it reproduces,
claims to rationality and universalism (Herzfeld 1993; Parsons 1951; Weber 1978).
Regardless of such claims, however, the promise of citizens’ equality before
the Italian state remains a chimera. Ever since Italy’s 19th century unification as a topdown bourgeois revolution (Gramsci [1971] 1999:104-106), Italian governments have
frequently relied on influence peddling and clientelism in order to bolster their often
precarious stability (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Ginsborg 1990; Ferrera 1996;
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Konig-Archibugi 2003; Mack Smith 1997, McCarthy 1995; Tullio-Altan 2000, Zinn
2002). Depending on corporativism in order to exercise its control over society, in the
early 20th century Italy’s Fascist administration further intensified the practice of
patronage (Roberts 1979:298)—and so did, after democracy had been restored, the
Christian Democratic party (DC) that was hegemonic for much of the Cold War era
(Wagner Pacifici 1986:30). In the early 1990s, when a barrage of corruption scandals
led the DC to its demise, the new parties of the Second Republic eagerly picked up
the baton. To date, corporativism and clientelism continue unabated, and the traffic in
favors, moneys, and votes between politicians and various sectors of Italian society is
as thick as ever (Ginsborg 2003; Pardo 1996; 2000).9
Deeply entangled with the pretense of universalism, the rationality of the
modern Italian state is just as contested. Few, in Italy, ignore that the country’s
complex, and often malfunctioning, bureacratic archipelago has largely been
proliferated in order to provide politicians with posts and resources for friends, kin,
and clients (Della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Tarrow 1977; Van Kersberger 1995).
Even as it keeps feeding into the country’s public debt, the unstoppable growth of
offices and positions has contributed to inflating the processes citizens are subjected
to in their dealings with the administration (Foot 2003:98). Thus, small business
owner Amalia reports:
I had to renew [a permit], the Sampierdarena office is usually open on
Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday from 9am till 2pm. I decide to go on a
Thursday. ... when I get there, they tell me “lady, since it’s summer we only
work on Mondays and Tuesdays, we no longer do Thursdays.” I go back the
following Monday, it takes me one hour forty-five minutes in traffic. I get
there, take a number, and wait in line for fifty minutes. When it’s my turn, I
walk in... and they say “here is the form... fill it in and turn it in at [our
downtown office] ... I drive downtown, it takes me half an hour just to find
parking, and when I get to the office it’s packed. I was there about an hour,
when it’s my turn [the employee] takes my form, puts a stamp on it, and says
“you can go.” I say, “Excuse me, what’s happening with this form now?”
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They say “it’s going back to the Sampierdarena office” Do you understand?
They made me go downtown because the stamp was downtown, but the form
goes back to Sampierdarena! Everybody was in this office for the same
reason. Why didn’t they give the stamp to that loser [in Sampierdarena]? They
had to create a job for somebody’s nephew [nipote]... You see how much time
and money this bureaucracy costs us, how much it cost me?
Amalia’s grievances against the high costs of self-proliferating bureaucracies
are echoed by small business owner Andrea. Just like Amalia, Andrea resents what he
perceives as an arbitrary appropriation of time and money at the hands of the public
administration. Just to name one: every year, Andrea and his landlord have to register
their lease with the local administration. This impost costs them a whopping €200
each; unlike other taxes, however, it does not even provide him with any services in
return. To make things worse, each time Andrea has to run an errand like this, he has
to close his store for hours on end. Spending half a day in a crowded municipal office
costs him dearly in terms of lost business. The moneys that go into supporting Italy’s
bloated bureaucracy--Andrea concludes--would be better spent elsewhere:
Whenever I make some black money [faccio del nero], I immediately recirculate it by going out for dinner or buying something... This is good for the
economy. If all [the money] goes into taxes, there is no money circulating, and
everybody is poorer.
Many Italians share Andrea and Amalia’s frustration at being caught between
the stern instrumental rationality of an administration that conducts its business
“without regard for person” (Weber 1978: 978) on one hand, and the equally
compelling types of logic informing their everyday lives on the other.10 The selfemployed, in particular, resent an etatization (Verdery 1996:40) of their time and
resources that defies neoliberal principles of efficient self-management and
competitiveness (Ong 2006:4). At times, this tension may provide aggrieved
taxpayers with a moral justification for an illegal activity such as tax evasion (Pardo
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1996:20). The latter, as Andrea’s case exemplifies, can thus be conceptualized as
restoring the beneficial primacy of the market’s invisible hand in the face of an
unreasonable state keen on freezing citizens’ time and money (Maurer 2007). And
yet, this stance is hardly alien from the contemporary state’s own logic.11
In recent years, the sentiments voiced by business owners and the selfemployed have been incorporated into the increasingly neoliberalized, and
increasingly flexible (Gledhill 2004) policies on tax fraud and evasion put forth by
Italy’s conservative governments. In 2003, for example, Berlusconi’s government
issued a complete fiscal amnesty (condono tombale): tax evaders could opt for paying
a fine and be exempted from more serious legal consequences. The import of the
condono penalty was a real bargain compared to the amounts that many had evaded.
Ironically, several of those who had been meticulous with their tax returns ended up
paying the fee, too. Accountants back then were informing their clients that, by not
requesting the condono, they would raise a red flag in the eyes of the finanza police,
thus triggering an audit. Since the common belief is that an audit inevitably brings
about fines even in the face of the most transparent fiscal conduct, many professionals
and business owners decided not to take the risk. Hence, while egregious tax evaders
got away with the financial equivalent of a slap on their hands, many of those who
had complied were penalized twice: once for paying taxes they could have evaded,
and then once again for having to pay a penalty they did not deserve. If fiscal
amnesties reconfigure tax minimizers as law-abiding and rational economic actors
(Maurer 2007:128), yet another consequence of Berlusconi’s condono was to force
many fiscally compliant citizens into choosing between what they perceived as state
extortion on one hand, and the risks involved in being wrongfully cast as evaders on
the other.
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Sandra, a street antique dealer who used to pride herself in her fiscal integrity,
was one of the taxpayers who begrudgingly applied for a condono they did not need.
Even though she had always paid her taxes in full, she was still afraid of an audit: “the
state is the state, and when they come after you they have to make it worth their
while,” she said. Caught in the incongruities of a self-contradicting state, Sandra
blamed herself for her naiveté as a law-abiding citizen: “Whenever there is a norm I
have to follow it. What can I say, I am an idiot!” What upset her even more was that
the amnesty was meant to benefit the great evaders at the expenses of everybody else:
honest taxpayers like her.
Knowing Sandra’s probity, I was all the more surprised when, in 2008, she
informed me she had opted for what, borrowing from a conservative rhetoric she
otherwise abhorred, she defined as disobbedienza fiscale: that is, she returned her
business license, thus becoming invisible to the internal revenues services even as she
continued to sell her goods at antique fairs. Indeed, Sandra’s decision was a “moment
of resistance” (Roitman 2005:8) driven by resentment as well as necessity. Mirroring
the overall economic decline of the middle and lower sectors of Italian society, in
2008 Sandra’s diminutive business had been doing poorly; in 2007 she had earned
50% less than in 2006, and in 2006 her pre-tax earnings were down by € 10,000
compared to 2005. In order to make ends meet, Sandra had had to cut down on her
already frugal lifestyle, and had been taking loans against her mother’s pension of
approximately € 900 monthly. Even these measures were no longer enough, though.
Her revenues were at an all-time low, and yet her taxes had just tripled. Due to the
stricter fiscal policies implemented by Prodi’s center-left government, what she now
owed in taxes for the current trimester no longer amounted to € 1,000, but rather to a
whopping € 3,500.
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Just as importantly, Sandra’s decision stemmed from the realization that those
illegal vendors who do not have a license and hence pay no taxes are not only subject
to few controls, but they also have it a lot easier financially. Known as abusivi, illegal
vendors are rarely penalized by fair organizers, many of whom do not check the
vendors’ credentials: “as long as you pay the rental fees, [they] don’t care.” The
organizers’ indifference to the normative is such, Sandra told me, that
at the Pindarolo12 fair last Sunday... the abusivi took the best spots; those with
a license instead were all piled up in a tiny little corner. I asked [the fair
organizer] why those guys have all that space and we don’t, and they told me,
well, it’s too late now, we already gave away all the spots. I say, I pay taxes
and I want a better spot like everybody else. “Sorry, there is nothing we can
do.” So I pick up my cell phone and call the fiscal police [by dialing] 117, and
they tell me “look, we have few patrols, we can’t go check now.” They keep
telling you... that the fiscal police has the duty to monitor tax frauds and
protect citizens’ rights, and yet “no” they tell me, “look madam, what you can
do is to write a grievance letter, sign it, and send it to the municipality.” So,
with my license and all, all I could do was to spend the day perched at the
edge of the fair, while the abusivi had their place in the sun.

Compounded with the inability to cope with an unreasonable fiscal pressure,
Sandra’s awareness of how free-riders (be they of the big- or small-fish variety) were
consistently left off the hook tilted her scale towards fiscal disobedience. She
canceled her business license, even as she continued to sell her goods at antique fairs.
After much study, she managed to create a barrage of counterfeit documents to be
used in case of a finanza raid, which she showed me with a mix of amusement and
pride: indeed, as spaces of danger, the margins of the state also foster creativity (Das
and Poole 2004:19). Besides, the risks involved in being caught, in Sandra’s case,
were somewhat limited--especially if weighed against the costs of fiscal probity: “if
they catch me [selling without a license], at most they’ll give me a fine,” she said.
Paying a € 300 penalty when, and most importantly if, the police ever found her
would be still preferable to paying thousands in taxes, anyway.
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Like Sandra, many of the disgruntled self-employed taxpayers with whom I
talked did not regard evasion as a crime, but rather as a justifiable form of resistance
in the face of a state that they perceive as constantly violating its own obligations—
such as the pledge of pursuing fairness in taxation by imposing the same level of
legibility (Scott 1998) on all citizens alike. As the owner of a small store put it:
You know, what happens is that the state, behaving the way it does, turns the
citizen into a thief, because you cannot afford to pay too many taxes [...] while
others don’t pay any at all. So, one says “why should I pay taxes when
[politicians] are ripping me and are unfair?”

This logic is clear. The social contract of modern citizenship is based on the
notion that citizens surrender part of their wealth to the state through their taxes, and,
in return, the state guarantees rights and public services (Roche 2002:76). Hence, not
only is the state expected to ensure that the wealth it has appropriated is redistributed
in the form of adequate services and the protection of citizens’ rights, but it also has to
make certain that the fiscal pressure is in and of itself equitable. After all, the belief
that the exchange between taxpayers and the state is fair is fundamental in supporting
the latter’s consent to taxation (Martin, Merotra, and Prasad 2009: 18). Pace Grillo
and his supporters, when the state is perceived as violating this contract, some
citizens—those who can afford it--may cease to interpret fiscal evasion as a
“robbery,” and they may refuse to see themselves as “thieves.” Evasion to them may
become a logical response to, or even a defense against, a predatory and unfair state.
Not all citizens, however, have access to the same options in their struggle for
fairness.

Fixed-income Citizens/Consumers and Scontrino Politics
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At least since the late 20th century, the actual laxity of the Italian state in
matters of tax enforcement has often gone hand in hand with the proliferation of
regulations formally meant to detect the revenues that are hidden by professionals,
business owners, and the self-employed (De Cecco and Pedone 1995:298). In 1983,
Socialist Minister of Finances Rino Formica sought to hamper fiscal evasion by
approving a normative that required all businesses to install fiscal cash registers on
their premises. Such devices would record all transactions, issuing receipts (scontrini
fiscali) that attest to the fiscal transparency of the purchase. Customers, in turn, would
have to request these documents and exhibit them at finanza (fiscal police)
checkpoints within a certain distance from the business. By embedding an official
record into the everyday practice of citizens, state officials sought to pass on the work
of surveillance to civilians, thus proliferating the labor of domination (Bourdieu
1999:71) and giving this surveillance a potentially capillary outreach that would not
have been possible otherwise. Not only did this norm further complicate the fiction of
the separation between state and society, but it also subjected the implementation of
the rational-universalistic principles of the regulatory state to the everyday life
choices and costs-benefits calculations of individual citizens. Just as importantly, it
also turned a structural issue into an object of minute daily contentions—though
highly significant ones for all the parties involved.
Until 2004, those patrons who were caught without a receipt were liable of
receiving a fine. Lucia was one of them. One Saturday evening, as she was leaving a
restaurant with her friends, she was approached by two nicely dressed young men
who made small talk about the quality of the food. Most Italians have strong opinions
when it comes to food, Lucia says, and she is certainly one of them. As soon as she
volunteered some information on her dining experience, the plain clothes officers
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flashed their badges and requested the receipt. Since at that time she had accepted to
forego the document in return for a small discount, she had to pay a fine. She felt
stupid, she told me, for being so easily tricked into confessing her infraction.
However, she felt even worse when she realized how she had been complicitous in a
practice that was not only illegal, but also went against her own interests as a diligent
taxpayer.
Even though nowadays patrons who do not have the receipt are no longer
liable to be fined, Lucia has become much more careful. After each purchase, she
usually insists on obtaining the receipt, regardless of the amount of the charge: “I’ll
just stand in their way and insist till they pull [the receipt] out. And if they don’t, fine
by me: I’ll call the fiscal police, and then we’ll see.” I do not think Lucia ever called
the police (after all, she has a hunch that finanza officers are not likely to heed such
trivial requests). However, on more than one occasion I saw her argue with reluctant
shopkeepers as she requested a scontrino: a practice that she regards as both her right
as a taxpayer, and her duty as a citizen. The reason for Lucia’s insistence is not just a
clear, though abstract, vision of what is right and what is wrong. Rather, she feels she
has a very personal stake in the struggle against tax evasion. Lucia is a retired school
teacher who, after paying 28% of her pension in taxes, lives on a monthly allowance
of about €1,200. Like many Italians on fixed income, she is extremely sensitive to the
issue of tax fraud: “every tax euro that is evaded,” she says, “is a tax euro that I will
have to pay out of my own pocket.”
Lucia’s sentiments are shared by many, and so is her militant attitude when it
comes to obtaining a receipt. Since 2008, for example, citizens who witness an
episode of fiscal evasion have the option of reporting it on evasori.info, a website that
shows a map of Italy with balloons pointing to each site where an evasion has
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happened over the previous 24 hours. The site also provides the exact time, the
business category, and the import of each infraction.13 As it fails to impose legibility
(Scott 1989) on large sectors of Italian society, the regulatory state comes across as
unable, or unwilling, to monitor fiscal fraud and evasion. Evasori.info, instead, tracks
the practice of evasion as it keeps happening, moment by moment, all over the
country, in a denunciation that encourages citizens to be more vigilant and do what is
in their power to stamp out evasion—that is, request the scontrini at each opportunity.
In the face of such capillary militancy, however, evasion continues undeterred.
Every now and then, even a righteous person like Lucia may have to close an eye.
Lucia’s hairdresser, for example, has a habit of handing out doctored receipts. Each
time she issues a receipt, the hairdresser will only report the styling, which amounts to
a fraction of the actual price, and she will instruct Lucia on what to tell the finanza
officers who may be lurking on the premises. In return, the hairdresser will give Lucia
a discount. Lucia got used to this small cunning, and does not object to it. After all,
she has known her hairdresser for thirty years now. Not only does she trust her
unconditionally with her hair, but she also tells her everything about herself, her life,
and her family: an intimacy that her hairdresser is happy to reciprocate, and that
cannot be comfortably interrupted by fiscal talk.
Yet, intimacy is not the only factor in establishing complicity around the
practice of fiscal evasion. Occasionally, what tilts the patron’s scale towards not
insisting on a receipt is a quick calculation of costs and benefits. Some physicians, for
example, customarily offer a deep discount to those patients who do not request the
receipt. Similarly high discounts are issued by home repair and construction
businesses, among others, in return for their clients’ complicity. “When the discount
is substantial,” Lucia observes, “it is hard to say ‘no’.” After all, her pension is too
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low to afford her the luxury of demanding fiscal probity from all of her fellow
citizens.
With all the dilemmas that riddle the seemingly trivial choice of whether to
request a receipt or not, Lucia’s considerations are emblematic of the complexities
and the tensions that face Italians on a daily basis. While the rhetoric of North
Atlantic neoliberalism posits the transformation of citizens into consumers (Canclini
2001), Italian consumers negotiating the boundary between state and market are
enlisted in a practice of surveillance through which they never cease to be citizens
with rights and especially duties vis-à-vis the state as well as each other. Each time
they purchase goods or services, they have the option to take on multiple subject
positions: they can choose to be accomplices in fiscal evasion, or, alternatively, foot
soldiers of state surveillance. Either way, they become the temporary arbiters of a
triangulated relationship between themselves, their providers of goods and services,
and the state. To those who feel that they have a stake in the correct functioning of the
revenue system, this possibility may give a temporary feeling of empowerment in the
face of dynamics that are otherwise beyond their reach. A banal decision such as
requesting a receipt, then, is a political act in a struggle for fiscal equity that the
regulatory state seems to be losing only too often.

Solidarity, Interrupted
The legitimacy of a taxation system depends not just on the perception of its
fairness in harnessing resources, but also on distribution: that is, how the state
employs the revenues it collects. Framed in terms of benefits for the collectivity, this
use includes funding disaster aid. When, in April 2009, a powerful earthquake
ravaged the Abruzzo region, a debate immediately ensued over how to help with a
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reconstruction that was going to cost billions of euros. Spontaneous fund-raising
efforts started all over the peninsula. Soon enough, though, such strong emotional
response became riddled with perplexities. The dust had barely settled on the ruins of
Abruzzo when voices began to rise questioning the opportunity to make donations.
This is when Loredana, a teacher and a usually highly compassionate individual,
informed me that she would not send any charity to the victims. She had already
donated a few euros through text-messaging, and that was it: “basta cosí—that’s
enough,” she stated. “I am sorry for the people from l’Aquila, but aid and
reconstruction are the responsibility of the state.” Her sister-in-law Rita chimed in:
“This is what we pay taxes for, isn’t it?” The trigger for Loredana and Rita’s change
of heart, they told me, had been an editorial in Genoa’s Il Secolo XIX daily, which
they both read regularly. Writing about the Italian state’s responsibilities vis-à-vis its
citizens, philosophy professor Mauro Barberis had declared he would no longer
contribute to charity efforts; he also exhorted his readers to do the same. This is how
Barberis explained his decision:
The problem is not that I, along with millions of salaried workers and
retirees, do not want to pay. The problem is that we are already paying. We are
already paying for Abruzzo, just like we have already paid for [the victims of
previous earthquakes in] Friuli, Irpinia, and Belice; I would not be surprised if
we were still paying for Messina’s 1908 earthquake.14
In all of these instances, Barberis argued, fixed-income taxpayers’ moneys had
been misused (if not downright embezzled) by negligent or corrupt state
representatives. Why keep paying, then? Though undoubtedly provocative, Barberis’
stance was not unique. In fact, among the first to raise this very same question was
Sicilian journalist Giancarlo di Girolamo. Di Girolamo, whose bold statement on
Facebook spread like wildfire over internet, wrote:
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I am not giving a penny, because I already pay taxes. A lot of them.
And these taxes already include the moneys for reconstruction, for aid, and for
civil protection. And these moneys are always spent to do other things. And
hence, each time the Civil Protection asks Italians for more money. And I say
no. Let them ask the many outstanding evaders who crisscross our country’s
economy… I won’t donate a penny for earthquake victims. And I don’t want
any charity if something happens to me. All I want is an efficient State that is
not controlled by the cunning.15
Di Girolamo’s declaration raised the question of what legitimates the state’s
appropriation of part of the citizens’ wealth (Roitman 2005:12). His was, in the first
place, a plea for a just and efficient Keynesian state. In the classic Keynesian social
contract, citizens accept to pay high taxes in return for public services and social
rights. In this paradigm, the acceptance of steep taxation levels and its model of
diffuse solidarity are supported by the understanding that anyone may end up needing
the safety net one helps subsidize through one’s tax money (Igniatieff 1995:67). This
type of state-mediated solidarity is the first casualty of North Atlantic neoliberal
ideology. As citizens are inculcated the individualistic credo of self-management
(Ong 2006:4), poverty and dependency become conceptualized as the fate that the
irresponsible bring upon themselves (Harvey 2005; Morgen and Maskovsky 2003).
Since the market is regarded as more efficient than the state at generating, managing,
and distributing resources, neoliberal subjects become eager to renounce public
services and entitlements in return for deep cuts in their taxes. Thus, the burden of
succoring the needy falls on a civil society that is defined as that “supposedly
autonomous space of individual freedom and voluntary association distinct from both
the state and the market, located between the private and the public… where citizens
can pursue the good life” (Wilder 1999:44).
Such ideology is hardly absent in Italy, where the fast growing terzo settore
(third sector) of volunteer work has blended Catholic and socialist solidarity models
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into a moral neoliberal imperative that posits itself as a humane alternative to the
welfare administered by an allegedly cold and distant state (Muehlebach 2007). Yet, I
contend that, whereas moral neoliberals may interpret a natural catastrophe like the
Abruzzo earthquake as an opportunity for civil society to relieve the state from the
burden of solidarity (or, vice-versa, to relieve citizens from the burden of dealing with
the state), appeals such as Di Girolamo’s posit a radically different type of social
contract. Faced with the state’s failure to collect and distribute citizens’ revenues
equitably, Di Girolamo, Barberis, and others are not inspired to advocate for a
Tocqueville-style charitable associationism. On the contrary: interrupting solidarity is
their way of calling the state to the duty of using taxpayers’ moneys appropriately in
order to guarantee citizens’ social rights.16

Keynes Envy
The history of social rights in contemporary Italy follows a discontinuous path
that began in the 1950s, when occupational groups started pledging their electoral
support in return for health care and retirement benefits (Koenig Archibugi
2003:102).17 This dynamic consolidated a corporative and clientelistic model (Ferrera
1996, Koenig-Archibugi 2003) whereby social rights reforms were often, in fact,
entitlement programs targeting specific groups rather than society as a whole (EspingAndersen 1990; Cantaro 1990). In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the plea
for social rights took on a more aggressive form as the massive strikes of industrial
workers became a common negotiation tool—a tool that was to be appropriated, a
decade later, by public-sector white-collar employees (Pipan 1989). Indeed, the use of
strikes in order to wrestle rights from reluctant employers and governments did much
to expand the Italian welfare state (Franzosi 1995). On the other hand, however, the
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measures taken in response to such emergencies were often driven by concerns about
a government’s stability and its key electorates rather than fairness and universalism
(Cantaro 1999:86; Pipan 1989:13). Hence, the policies thus put into place afford core
sectors of the labor force a protection that is often denied to most other citizens
(Esping Andersen 1990: 27; Ferrera 1984:140 and 2000:168; see also Reyneri 1997).
At times, the particularistic practices embedded in the Italian social state go beyond
corporativism to extend entitlements to individuals who do not qualify for them. This
is the case, for example, of the thousands of disability pensions that, since the 1970s,
have been bestowed upon ineligible individuals in return for votes (Ferrera 1984:202).
Dynamics such as these greatly contribute to the inconsistent distribution of public
resources in Italian society.
Combined with the awareness that the very same middle classes that finance
the welfare state are rarely among those who reap its benefits (Ferrera 1984:242-243),
the perception of, and anxieties about, distributive unfairness mar the relationship
between citizens and the state as well as among fellow citizens (Cantaro 1999:34-35).
These sentiments become particularly acute when distribution takes on the form of
services that, like unemployment benefits, health care, education, public housing, and
child care (just to name a few) are not only tapped individually (Murphy and Nagel
2002:48), but whose provision is also regulated on the basis of factors such as income
and occupational status: factors that establish formal differences in access and costs to
the user (Ferrera 1984:245). Often, these disparities reflect an institutional attempt to
establish a vertical distributive equity whereby sacrifices and benefits are allocated in
proportion to citizens’ income and needs (Murphy and Nagel 2002:13). Even in these
cases, however, the lack of trust in the state may promote envious comparisons, or
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even a racialized victimology (Holmes 2000:144) that feeds on the perception of
distributive inequities.
In Italy, the suspicion that the state may be funneling taxpayers’ money into
the pockets of the “wrong” ethnic groups goes at least as far back as the mid twentieth
century. This is when a Christian Democratic government created the Cassa del
Mezzogiorno (the Fund for Southern Italy) for the official sake of helping
development in the South—but, as a matter of fact, as a tool for distributing lucrative
contracts and other favors in return for votes and money (Foot 2003:153; Tullio Altan
2000:137). After several decades of scandals and public discontent, the cassa was
finally abolished in 1992. The practice of squandering taxpayers’ moneys, however,
continued, and it kept feeding north Italians’ conspiracy theories that blend facts with
speculations and ethnic revanchism (Schneider 1998:2-3). If, indeed, weak national
sentiments contribute to delegitimizing fiscal systems (Bourdieu 1999:60; Feldman
and Slemrod 2009), and if the willingness to sacrifice part of one’s wealth for the
common good depends on one’s feelings for the community of appurtenance
(Lieberman 2009), it is also true that contentious forms of taxation and distribution
may further undermine national cohesion and inclusiveness. Ever since its inception
in the 1980s, Umberto Bossi’s Northern League party has successfully capitalized on
these sentiments, expanding its invectives against Roma ladrona (Rome the thief) and
its southern clienteles (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001:13-14) to include more explicitly
anti-immigrant opinions. Just like Bossi, various conservative representatives have
become adept at tapping into citizens’ concerns that their tax money may, indeed,
benefit “other” social categories: not only, or not necessarily, Southern Italians (many
of whom, after all, support Berlusconi’s own party), but also, and most importantly,
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Gypsies and immigrants, whom Berlusconi’s media frequently stigmatize as
professional thieves and violent criminals, and hence undeserving of welfare rights.
One of the Northern League’s recent posters, for example, shows a small
crowd waiting in front of a door, seemingly trying to access the public benefits listed
in the caption: housing, employment, and health care.18 “Guess who is last?” the
poster asks rhetorically. A stereotypical Chinese, a grotesque Gypsy woman with a
baby in her arms, a bejeweled African man, and an Arab holding a dagger are shoving
aside a helpless elderly man, who is the only white Italian in the line: hence, as the
poster not so subtly suggests, the only one who should really be entitled to the
benefits.
Since the 1980s, Italian right-wing parties such as the Northern League have
increasingly questioned the extension of free health care (mutua) benefits to
immigrants. In 2009, Italy’s conservative government passed a law that enabled
physicians in public health care facilities to report those illegal immigrants who seek
their services. This decision drew the support of many of those who feel that
extending rights to immigrants may curtail their own access to public services, even
as it increases their taxes. What these tax-payers often find upsetting is the
consideration that, due to their low income status, immigrants are frequently
exempted from co-pays. As a the owner of a small firm put it,
I pay twice for mutua. I pay once [for public health care] through my taxes,
and then I have to pay again whenever I go and book a visit [with a
specialist]…When my wife had a car accident and was taken to the emergency
room, she had to pay a ticket (co-pay). The Moroccan who rammed into her
car, instead, was treated for free. This, I don’t think is fair. He doesn’t pay
taxes, and on top of it he gets all health care services for free. Of course [he
does]: I am paying it all for him!
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The list of grievances against the alleged privileges of immigrants does not
end with public health care services, though. Parents of young children trying to cope
with the scarcity of daycare centers also frequently resent what they perceive as the
preference accorded to immigrants. Due to their low income status, the latter are
relatively more likely to gain admission, and may also stand a better chance of being
exempted from tuition and other fees. This is what Alessia, a part-time white collar
employee and the mother of a four year old, told me:
Just for the sake of keeping my son in a child care facility I have to pay 320
euros a month, whereas extracomunitari (non-EU immigrants) pay nothing. I
spend 4.5 euros a day on lunch, and my son who eats next to nothing has to
subsidize the others who eat a lot more and pay nothing. Besides, Italian
children are put on a waiting list, while foreigners are immediately admitted.
As a former leftist and a Catholic who had been active in charitable
organizations, Alessia had agonized for a while over what to make of her situation.
Whichever way she looked at it, however, she still felt that the state was not being
fair—especially since the daycare tuition cost her about half of her salary:
This is not right. I am not saying ‘leave [the children of immigrants] out,’ but
[public daycare centers should] admit Italians first, and then create quotas for
foreigners.
Alessia’s frustration is shared by many working mothers. Since the early
1990s, only approximately 6 % of all toddlers in Italy have had access to public
daycare (Naldini 2003:159). This dearth of services bears witness to the extent to
which the patriarchal and familist Italian state draws on women’s invisible and unpaid
labor in order to avoid public investments in the care of the young and the elderly
(Esping Andersen 1990; Ferrera 1996 and 2000; Naldini 2003; Schierup, Housen and
Castles 2006). As women’s role as caregivers continues to be naturalized (Plesset
2006; Krause 2004; Yanagisako 2002), structural inequities in their social rights still
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go largely undetected. On the other hand, little does it matter that, in their capacity as
badanti (caregivers for the elderly), many immigrant women are taking up an
essential role that the patriarchal state has never fulfilled, and that Italian women are
struggling to juggle (Naldini 2003); regardless of their contribution to the host
society, they are still targeted by a diffuse discontent that blames them for the scarcity
of public services available to Italian families.
Since its inception, the Northern League party—for which Alessia nowadays
casts her vote--has been adept at exploiting grievances such as hers (Cento Bull and
Gilbert 2001).19 As the Italian economy keeps deteriorating, high inflation rates, the
fast disappearance of tenured employment (Molé 2008; 2010) and a stifling fiscal
pressure have fuelled the malcontent of large segments of the middle- and working
classes. Combined with the growing mistrust for a leftist political leadership that even
many former progressive voters perceive, at best, as elitist and indifferent (ITANES
2009), and at worst as incompetent or downright corrupt, this scenario supports the
sentiment that any concession towards immigrants may indeed be a betrayal
perpetrated against “legitimate” (because tax-paying, Italian-born, and white) citizens.
In recent years, anthropologists have observed how ethnic minorities become
scapegoats for the costs that global dynamics exact locally, even as nation-states fail
to assuage the problems affecting their citizens (Appadurai 2006; Holmes 2000). Even
though such dynamics are obviously at play in the Italian context, here the
xenophobic discourse also emerges from a competitive relationship between
disgruntled citizens, “their” state (the one to which they pay taxes, and by whose
services they are frequently disappointed), and immigrants (who allegedly pay no
taxes, and yet still receive some benefits).
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In US neoliberal discourse, immigrants and the urban poor are frequently
accused of taking advantage of the state at the expenses of taxpayers who would much
rather renounce rights and services in return for deep tax cuts (Morgen and
Maskovsky 2003). The Italian scenario, however, is somewhat different. Here, few
would really question the need for public services: just like in other Western
European democracies, in Italy the perception of the relationship between taxation
and citizens’ rights is still pervasive (Guyer 1992). The disappointment, instead, is
caused by the broken promise of Keynesianism: that is, the failure to honor a social
contract whereby citizens consent to aggressive fiscal policies in return for adequate
public services and social rights (Igniatieff 1995).20
Thus Paolo, a formerly progressive lawyer, complained to me that, even
though he pays about 60% of his revenues in taxes, he still had to chip in and buy
equipment for his daughter’s school—aren’t public schools the responsibility of the
state, which he subsidizes profusely, anyway? And when he goes to the doctor or
rides the bus he has to pay again, too, even though he already paid for these services
through his taxes:
No, look, even the Soviet Union was better [than contemporary Italy]: they
would take all the money you made, but in return they would give you
everything you needed: a home, free health care, food, a car, and gas. Here,
instead, they take our money in return for nothing.
His tax money, he concluded, “is used to upholster the armchairs of
politicians, and [politicians] give away whatever is left in charity for immigrants.” As
fiscal pressure remains high even in the face of the quick erosion of social rights and
the state’s failure to deliver satisfactory services, frustrated taxpayers like Paolo are
easily tempted to blame their woes on immigrants along with the corrupt, inefficient
government that seems to grant foreigners rights it denies its own citizens.
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Racism, as Etienne Balibar suggested, is a “relationship to the other that is
mediated by the state” (1991:15). Indeed, racism is deeply embedded in Italian
immigration laws and practices. Yet, the role of the Italian state in mediating racism
goes beyond the formulation and enforcement of discriminatory laws. In fact, this role
also involves the state’s own lack of credibility and its consequent inability to
persuasively defend the few social rights it grants to immigrants.21 This lack of
legitimacy leaves ample room for dismissals of what conservatives call “leftist goodygoody-ism (buonismo della sinistra)” in the face of any attempt to extend a safety net
to immigrants.

Conclusion: It Takes Three to Tango
In this paper, I explored some of the ways in which Italian citizens articulate
the tension between the state’s pledge of fiscal fairness and distributive universalism
on one hand, and the seemingly capricious application of rights, duties, and
entitlements on the other. Drawing on an ethnography of the current discourse on
fiscal probity, evasion, and the social rights, I approached fiscal citizenship as an
emergent relational category that is constantly negotiated along and across the split
between the rhetoric of equity on one hand, and its actual denial on the other. I then
suggested that the fiscal contract in Italy is perceived and practiced as inherently
unstable, marred as it is by a sui generis specter of comparison (Anderson 1998)
among citizens: a rift that is contextually modulated along the lines separating the
salaried classes from the self-employed, North Italians from Southerners, and native
white Italians from immigrants—just to name a few. This antagonism, I argued, is
mediated by the state.
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“Tutti i cittadini sono uguali davanti alla legge:” all citizens are equal before
the law, reads article three of the Italian constitution. And yet, few Italians would
argue that this principle is consistently applied, especially when it comes to the state’s
role in harnessing and distributing resources. As one retiree put it,
The state should be like a family father: I give him my money and he should
administer it for my sake and for the sake of all. Hence, in practice the state
should take care of my needs whenever I cannot afford to do something on my
own; I am thinking of the health care system, or maintaining the streets. After
all I give him money to do these things—but he should do them equitably,
which is obviously not the case.

In this apt characterization of a state that is selectively paternalistic, the
“father” who promises fairness is guilty of betraying his children’s expectations—
possibly by privileging some of the siblings at the expenses of others. This sentiment
calls into question a fiscal contract that, on one hand, is appreciated for the services
and benefits it promises, while, on the other hand, it is perceived as being frequently
broken by an untrustworthy state and the citizens it seems to favor. For those who
have honed the perception of being constantly cheated of social rights and services for
which they (literally) pay profusely, even the opportunity to extend solidarity across
the social spectrum becomes haunted by suspicions and revanchist comparisons:
comparisons that are all the more envious when compounded with the ascription of
racial and ethnic differences and the ensuing denial of belonging.
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